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Abstract
Achieving accurate judgment (‘judgmental achievement’) is of utmost importance in daily life across multiple domains. The
lens model and the lens model equation provide useful frameworks for modeling components of judgmental achievement
and for creating tools to help decision makers (e.g., physicians, teachers) reach better judgments (e.g., a correct diagnosis,
an accurate estimation of intelligence). Previous meta-analyses of judgment and decision-making studies have attempted to
evaluate overall judgmental achievement and have provided the basis for evaluating the success of bootstrapping (i.e.,
replacing judges by linear models that guide decision making). However, previous meta-analyses have failed to
appropriately correct for a number of study design artifacts (e.g., measurement error, dichotomization), which may have
potentially biased estimations (e.g., of the variability between studies) and led to erroneous interpretations (e.g., with
regards to moderator variables). In the current study we therefore conduct the first psychometric meta-analysis of
judgmental achievement studies that corrects for a number of study design artifacts. We identified 31 lens model studies
(N = 1,151, k = 49) that met our inclusion criteria. We evaluated overall judgmental achievement as well as whether
judgmental achievement depended on decision domain (e.g., medicine, education) and/or the level of expertise (expert vs.
novice). We also evaluated whether using corrected estimates affected conclusions with regards to the success of
bootstrapping with psychometrically-corrected models. Further, we introduce a new psychometric trim-and-fill method to
estimate the effect sizes of potentially missing studies correct psychometric meta-analyses for effects of publication bias.
Comparison of the results of the psychometric meta-analysis with the results of a traditional meta-analysis (which only
corrected for sampling error) indicated that artifact correction leads to a) an increase in values of the lens model
components, b) reduced heterogeneity between studies, and c) increases the success of bootstrapping. We argue that
psychometric meta-analysis is useful for accurately evaluating human judgment and show the success of bootstrapping.
Citation: Kaufmann E, Reips U-D, Wittmann WW (2013) A Critical Meta-Analysis of Lens Model Studies in Human Judgment and Decision-Making. PLoS ONE 8(12):
e83528. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528
Editor: Zhong-Lin Lu, The Ohio State University, Center for Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Center for Cognitive and Behavioral Brain Imaging, United States of
America
Received February 17, 2013; Accepted November 4, 2013; Published December 31, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Kaufmann et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work is funded by a fellowship for Esther Kaufmann to attend the Graduate School of Economics & Social Sciences in Mannheim (Germany) offered
by the Excellence Intitiative of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (see: http://www.dfg.de/en/index.jsp). The funders had no role in study design, data
collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: esther.kaufmann@gmx.ch
Introduction
Improving judgment and decision making is of utmost
importance across multiple domains of life, as even minor
inaccuracies can sometimes have a major impact. For example,
within the medical domain, if a physician is able to accurately
diagnosis cancer, the patient will likely receive early treatment and
has a greater chance to survive. Within other domains such as
business or education, individuals (e.g., managers, teachers) must
make important decisions over the use of human and financial
resources based on their judgment of ambiguous situations (e.g.,
the payoff of a certain strategy, the intelligence of a student).
Hence, it is no wonder that judgmental achievement and decision-
making has for many years been an important area of research as
reflected in the considerable number of studies which have
evaluated the success of human judgment across multiple fields
(e.g., [1–3]). Within judgment and decision-making approaches,
the lens model ([4], see below) provides a useful framework for
understanding and modeling components of judgmental achieve-
ment. Previous meta-analyses of lens model studies have indicated
that estimates of judgmental achievement vary widely across
studies (see [5]). Because previous meta-analyses [5], [6] have not
corrected for methodological artifacts (e.g., measurement error),
previous estimates of judgmental achievement are likely biased.
Furthermore, there is ambiguity with regards to the extent to
which heterogeneity in estimates of judgmental achievement
across studies stems from methodological artifacts as opposed to
‘substantial’ differences due to underlying moderators (e.g.,
decision domain, judge expertise).
To address the problems with previous meta-analyses, we
conduct a psychometric meta-analysis of lens model studies across
a number of decision-making domains (e.g., business, medicine,
education, psychology). We correct for multiple study design
artifacts (e.g., sampling error, measurement error, dichotomiza-
tion). We compare results of a traditional meta-analytical
approach with the psychometric approach to examine how
methodological artifacts bias estimates and may lead to erroneous
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interpretations. Furthermore, we examine the extent to which
judgmental achievement varies by domain (e.g., if physicians judge
more accurately than teachers), level of expertise (i.e., if experts
judge more accurately than novices), and whether the effect of
expertise differs by domain (i.e., if expertise leads to better
accuracy in some domains but not in others).
Finally, a further goal of the current paper is to contribute to the
development of better decision making tools. Researchers have
used the lens model equation to build linear models to ‘bootstrap’
judges (that is, replace human judges by equations to guide
decision making) to increase judgment accuracy. For example,
researchers have built models that physicians can use to make
important medical judgments (see for example [7]). Previous meta-
analyses have suggested that bootstrapping judges generally results
in a slight increase in judgmental achievement relative to human
judgment, although there seems to be high heterogeneity in its
success (e.g., [2], [6]). However, it is possible that failure to correct
for methodological artifacts may have led to an over- or
underestimation of the potential success of bootstrapping relative
to human judges. We therefore examine whether psychometrical-
ly-corrected linear models for decision making can increase the
success of bootstrapping.
The Lens Model Framework
The lens model [4] identifies multiple components of judgment
(in) accuracy. In a typical lens model study, a ‘judge’ must make a
number of decisions based on different pieces of information (‘cues’).
Judgmental achievement is measured by the extent to which the
judge’s judgment matches (i.e., correlates) with an indicator of the
actual outcome or situation (‘criterion’). Einhorn (second study, [8])
provides an example of a typical lens model study (see Figure 1). In
this study, physicians evaluated the severity of Hodgkin’s disease
(cancer) based on patient’s biopsy slides (see the right side of
Figure 1, Ys). Physicians made a judgment with regards to the
estimated survival time, which was compared with the actual
number of months of survival (see the left side of Figure 1, Ye). A
high correlation between physicians’ judgments and the actual
months of survival indicated high judgmental achievement.
The lens model is the basis for the lens model equation (LME;
see [9–11]; for more background information on the LME, see
[12]). As shown in Equation 1, the LME mathematically describes
judgmental achievement (ra, i.e., the correlation between a
person’s judgments and a particular criterion) in terms of four
components. Namely, judgmental achievement is equal to a linear
knowledge term (G) multiplied by task predictability term (Re) term
multiplied by a consistency term (Rs) plus a non-linear knowledge term (C).
The linear knowledge component (G) refers to the correlation
between the predicted human judgment and the predicted criterion
(e.g., the predicted physician’s judgment about survival time, the
predicted actual months of survival). Task predictability (Re) refers to
the multiple correlation of the cues with the criterion (e.g., the extent
to which characteristics of the biopsy slide correlate with the months
of survival), or in other words, the extent to which a decision can be
made based on the information available. Consistency (Rs) refers to
the reliability of judgments, that is, the extent to which a judge
reliably reaches the same decision based on the same pieces of
information (e.g., the extent to which a physician reaches the same
diagnosis based on biopsy slides with the similar characteristics), or
in other words, the multiple correlation of the cues with the person’s
estimates. The non-linear knowledge component (C) represents the
correlation between the variance not captured by the environmental
predictability component or the consistency component (i.e., the
correlation between the residuals from the above predictions).
Previous research has revealed that the non-linear knowledge
component is generally quite small (average C= .08, [13], p. 129);
hence we exclude it from our analysis.
The definitions of the single components in detail are:
ra= the achievement index (i.e., the correlation between a
person’s judgments and the criterion),
Re= the task predictability index (i.e., the multiple correlation of
the cues with the criterion),
Rs=consistency (i.e., the multiple correlation of the cues with a
judge’s estimate),
G=a knowledge index that reflects achievement (i.e., the
correlation between the predicted levels of the criterion and the
predicted judgments), and
C=an unmodeled knowledge component that signifies the
correlation between the variance not captured by the environ-
mental predictability component or the consistency component
(i.e., the correlation between the residuals from the above
predictions).
ra~G RsRezC
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1{R2s
q ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1{R2e
q
ð1Þ
The success of bootstrapping judges with a linear model
The lens model can be used to create linear judgment models
(i.e., equations) that can be used to support judgment and decision
Figure 1. The lens model applied to physicians’ diagnosis of cancer (see [8]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.g001
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making, essentially by ‘correcting’ for the inconsistency with which
human judges use cues to reach a judgment. The process (and
success) of replacing a human judge with a judgment model is
referred to as ‘bootstrapping’ (see [6], [14]) and is also discussed
under the topic of ‘man versus model of man’ (see [8]). The idea of
creating such judgment models can be traced back to Meehl’s [15]
evaluation of whether clinical psychologists reach more accurate
judgments about a patient relative to an equation.
Linear judgment models are defined with the same linear
knowledge (G) and task predictability (Re) terms as in the lens
model (see Equation 1), but with the assumption that there is
perfect consistency in how a judge uses a particular piece of
information (Rs=1), which is of course never the case with a
human judge. As displayed in Equation 2, the success of a linear
judgment model relative to a human judge can be estimated by the
difference between the linear judgment model on the one hand
and human judgmental achievement ra on the other hand (for
details, see [2], p. 413):
D~GRe{ra ð2Þ
Previous Meta-Analyses of Judgmental Achievement
Previous meta-analyses of lens model studies have revealed a
large heterogeneity of judgmental achievement estimates across
studies [5], [6] and that the success of bootstrapping judges with a
linear judgment model generally results in only a slight increase in
judgmental achievement (e.g., [2], [6]). However, to the best of our
knowledge, no previous meta-analysis has followed a psychometric
approach that appropriately corrects for multiple methodological
artifacts. When left uncorrected, methodological differences
between the studies included in the meta-analyses such as varying
sample sizes (sampling error), varying reliability of the measure-
ments used in different studies (measurement error), and
dichotomization of a continuous variable can lead to biased
estimations. Two previous meta-analyses of lens model studies
(e.g., [5], [6]) applied ‘bare-bones meta-analysis’ (i.e., only correct
for sampling error; [16], p. 132), but they did not control for other
methodological artifacts. In the current study, we build on the
results of previous bare-bones meta-analyses and follow the
psychometric Hunter-Schmidt approach (see below) to correct
for multiple study design artifacts and thus, we argue, arrive at less
biased estimates of the LME components. We also check the
robustness of our results by estimating the potential effect of
publication bias, that is, the phenomenon for studies with
significant results to be published more often relative to studies
with non-significant results. In our case, it could be that studies
with zero correlations are probably reported less frequently than
studies with at least moderate correlations. Publication bias may
thus threaten the representativeness of the studies included in the
meta-analysis. We describe a new method for estimating potential
publication bias (see below).
In the current study, we also extend previous research and
investigate whether judgmental achievement varies according to
judge expertise and decision domain. Karelaia and Hogarth [6]
found that expertise is negatively related to judgmental achievement;
however the authors did not control for decision domain. The
authors concluded that expertise in some domains may be
particularly difficult to develop and hence only weakly related to
judgmental achievement (see also [17], [18]). Kaufmann and
Athanasou [5] considered different decision domains, but they
neglected to simultaneously consider judges’ expertise. In the
current psychometric meta-analysis, we therefore simultaneously
investigate both expertise and decision domain as well as expertise
within domains as potential moderators of judgmental achieve-
ment. Does expertise matter more in some domains relative to
others? Finally, we also compare the success of bootstrapping (see
Equation 2) with linear judgment models based on estimates of the
LME components generated from bare-bones meta-analysis with
the success of bootstrapping with linear judgment models based on
estimates generated from psychometric meta-analysis.
Methods
Description of the Database
The flowchart in Figure 2 depicts the five literature search
strategies used in the current study (see Figure 2, point A). To find
studies, we searched relevant databases (e.g. PsycINFO, Psyndex,
Web of Science) using different keywords (e.g., ‘lens model’, ‘lens
model equation’, ‘judgmental achievement’) as well as key articles
and books in the area of research and activated a Google alert to
notify us of any new relevant publications. We then cross-checked
the database with sources found in other reviews (e.g., [19], see
point B in the flowchart).
Point C lists the exclusion criteria. To prevent any aggregation
bias, we only considered studies on judgment that had aggregated
results across individuals, thus excluding those with aggregated
results across cues (e.g., [20]). We included data derived from lens
model studies of individual judges and of aggregated data across
judges. We observe that the idiographic approach is often
neglected in lens model studies [21]. Hence, mostly aggregated
judgments made by multiple judges as opposed to judgments of
single judges are reported in lens model studies.
In the current study we were interested in evaluating
judgmental achievement without any feedback opportunities as would
be the case in naturalistic, everyday settings. Business managers,
for example, receive little feedback on the accuracy of their
judgments. Moreover, they often can have no idea whether the
feedback they do in fact receive is accurate or not (see [22]).
Likewise, physicians frequently do not get any feedback about the
accuracy of their judgments, as patients fail to return or are
referred elsewhere, or diagnoses remain uncertain [23]. We
therefore excluded studies in which judges received ongoing
feedback on the accuracy of their decisions and/or had the
opportunity to learn during the tasks. We argue that studies that
included feedback and/or learning opportunities do not adequate-
ly represent the daily life of participants and could thus have
biased our results.
Further details on the construction of our database, such as our
search protocol, are available in Kaufmann [13].
A total of 31 studies met our inclusion criteria [8], [14], [23–51].
The studies were coded based on certain characteristics (e.g., year
of publication, sample size) or possible moderator variables
(judges’ level of expertise, decision domain). Tables 1 and 2
summarize the characteristics of the included studies. Decision
domain was coded as medicine, business, psychology, education,
or as miscellaneous. With the exception of the medical domain, all
other domains included both experts and non-experts (i.e.,
students) as judges. The database included 49 judgment tasks
with 1,151 judgments made by 1,055 participants. Of the 1,055
participants, 68 participated in more than one task. Compared to
the database by Kaufmann and Athanasou [5] our database is
slightly different due to improved analysis tools and additional
studies (e.g., [51]).
A Critical Meta-Analysis
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The Psychometric Meta-Analytical Approach
Several studies contributed to the eventual development of
various meta-analytical approaches in the 1970s (e.g., [15], [52],
[53]). For example, Eysenck [52] concluded from a narrative
review that psychotherapy was ineffective, prompting a response
from the experienced therapist Glass, who statistically compared
the outcomes of psychotherapy and refuted Eysenck’s conclusion
([54], see also [55]). Since then, researchers have used meta-
analysis to systematically summarize the outcomes of multiple
studies to increase the generalizability of results (e.g., regarding the
effectiveness of psychological, pedagogical and behavioral inter-
ventions [56]; regarding predictors of student achievement [57]).
The meta-analytical approach has undergone continuous
development, resulting in a number of approaches such as the
Hedges-Olkin [58], the Rosenthal-Rubin [59] and the Hunter-
Schmidt [16] approach (for an overview, see [60], [61]; for a
critical discussion, [62]). Field [63], [64] evaluated different
traditional meta-analytical approaches and favored the random-
effect model of the Hunter-Schmidt approach. The random-effect
model takes into account that the studies included in a meta-
analysis are drawn from a greater ‘population’ of studies. Hence,
differences in effect sizes across studies arise from sources within as
well as between studies. The traditional, ‘bare bones’ Hunter-
Schmidt approach (as evaluated by Field) corrects for sampling
error: Since meta-analysis is generally based on many studies with
different sample sizes, sampling error is inherent in the data (larger
for smaller sample sizes). The Hunter-Schmidt approach has since
been additionally modified to correct for up to 11 other
methodological artifacts (‘psychometric Hunter-Schmidt ap-
proach’; [16], p. 35). Since multiple methodological artifacts
threaten the estimations of the LME parameters, we argue that the
psychometric Hunter-Schmidt is the most appropriate approach
for the current study, since it is the only meta-analytical approach
that corrects for multiple differences in study design.
With regards to potential bias due to measurement artifacts, the
knowledge component (G) is attenuated by the unreliability of the
estimate of the judge, the unreliability of the criterion and the
restriction of range in both. Therefore, the bias inherent in
estimates of the knowledge component (G) can be corrected when
S (restriction or enhancement of range), the reliability of the judge
(see rtt
Rs) and the reliability of the criterion (see rtt
Re) are known.
The knowledge component can thus be described as in Equation
3:
G~S
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
(rRstt |r
Re
tt
q
)|Gtrue ð3Þ
Neglecting the nonlinear knowledge term (C) in Equation 1 and
considering it as an error term e, substituting Equation 3 into
Equation 1 results in Equation 4:
ra~S
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
(rRsrr|r
Re
tt )
q
|GtrueRsReze ð4Þ
Figure 2. The process of identifying relevant studies for the meta-analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.g002
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Therefore the unbiased estimate of the knowledge component (G)
corrected for attenuation and restriction of range would be
Equation 5:
Gtrue~
(ra{e)
S
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
(rRstt |r
Re
tt
p
)|RsRe
ð5Þ
In Equation 5, the psychometric Hunter-Schmidt approach
incorporates the estimation of the population parameter according
to Wittmann [65], [66]. This equation serves as an illustration of
how to psychometrically meta-analyze the LME in our study. The
psychometrically-corrected component (e.g., G) is called ‘‘true’’
and is an approximation of the value without any study design
artifact. The ‘‘true’’ value is for example the actual judgmental
achievement or the knowledge component without any artifacts
introduced by the study design. Put simply, Equation 5 can be
divided into three parts.
Firstly, the numerator of the fraction, the term e, represents
sampling error. Meta-analysis carried out for the purpose of
population estimation is often based on different studies including
different numbers of participants, which results in sampling errors.
Such a sampling error is larger for smaller sample sizes and can be
positive or negative. It should be noted that traditional bare-bones
meta-analysis corrects only for sampling error, although several
additional study design artifacts (as introduced) are known. Due to
the bias related to sampling error, there is a risk to over- or to
underestimate the particular component.
Second, the first part in the denominator describes psychomet-
ric concepts of the reliability associated with judges and tasks.
Failure to correct for the reliability of tasks or judges introduces two
dangers that may result in an underestimation of the component.
In addition, failure to correct for selection problems, known either
as restriction or as enhancement of range might lead to under- or
overestimation of for example judgmental achievement as maybe
an extremely easy or difficult task.
Third, in the second part in the denominator, the term RsRe, can
be traced back to Brunswik’s research and the LME (see Equation
2) and represents construct reliability. Wittmann [67], [66], further
extended Hunter-Schmidt’s psychometric approach by adding the
symmetry concept. Judgmental achievement increases if both the
judgment and the criterion are measured at the same level of
Table 3. Comparison of estimations of judgmental achievement (ra) with different meta-analytical approaches ordered by domain
and experience level.
Bare-bones meta-analysis Psychometric meta-analysis
Credibility
interval
Credibility
interval
Domains, experience levels k N ra varcorr 75% .10 .80 ra varcorr 75% .10 .80
Medical sciencea 10 258 .40 .00 157.00 .40 .40 .53 .00 170.93 .53 .53
Business science 9 239 .50 .07 24.45 .16 .83 .55 .09 24.45 .16 .93
Publication bias 13 332 .22 .31 13.56 2.50 .93
Experts 6 116 .36 .00 87.73 .36 .36 .40 .00 87.73 .40 .40
Publication bias 9 136 .27 .05 60.24 2.01 .55
Students 3 123 .63 .10 8.52 .22 1.00 .70 .11 8.52 .27 1.12
Education science 4 156 .39 .00 177.89 .39 .39 .51 00 355.11 .51 .51
Publication bias 5 176 .41 .02 74.99 .22 .59
Experts 2 40 .57 .00 975.69 .57 .57 .62 .00 975.69 .62 .62
Students 2 116 .33 .00 27,143 .33 .33 .55 .00 82,558 .55 .55
b 2 116 .36 .00 27,136 .36 .36
Psychology 14 249 .22 .00 448.50 .22 .22 .24 .00 448.54 .24 .24
Experts 4 59 .10 .00 975.77 .10 .10 .11 .00 975.77 .11 .11
Students 10 190 .26 .00 606 .26 .26 .29 .00 607.07 .29 .29
Miscellaneous 12 249 .44 .02 67.55 .25 .62 .49 .02 67.55 .31 .67
Experts 5 15 .65 .00 401.61 .65 .65 .68 .00 401.61 .68 .68
Publication bias 7 23 .31 .00 158.46 .31 .31
Students 11 234 .43 .00 86.40 .43 .43 .48 .00 86.55 .48 .48
Publication bias 16 276 .35 .07 53.59 .01 .68
Overall 49 1,151 .39 .02 69.42 .21 .57 .45 .02 74.55 .27 .63
Experts 27 488 .37 .00 129.00 .37 .37 .47 .00 135.00 .47 .47
Students 26 663 .40 .02 58.94 .21 .58 .46 .02 64.20 .27 .64
Note. k=Number of correlations (tasks) according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. N= Total sample size according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. ra=mean true score
correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. varcorr= corrected variation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). 75%
rule = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artifacts, if below 75%, it indicates moderator variable. – mean true score correlation increased the value of
1.
aIn medical science only experts are included.
bwe reran the analysis and substituted the .09 value with a .90 value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.t003
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aggregation (i.e., they are ‘symmetrical’). For example, if a
physician is asked to judge whether cancer is present and the
criterion is whether a cancer tumor was detected, then the
judgment is not symmetrical, as cancer can exist without a
detectable tumor. In contrast, if a physician is asked to judge
whether there is cancer only when a cancer tumor has been
detectable, then the judgment and the criterion are said to be
symmetrical. We did not control for symmetry in the current
analysis. Neglecting symmetry may lead to two additional risks of
potentially underestimating the components.
To summarize, due to the potential for different methodological
artifacts, there is a tendency to over- or underestimate the ‘‘true
value’’ of each component as illustrated by Equation 5. Based on
Equation 5, the odds of underestimating the component with a
bare-bones meta-analysis are 6 (sampling error, reliability of tasks
or judges, selection effects, symmetry of tasks, judges) to 2
(sampling error, selection effects) as compared with estimates
generated from a psychometric meta-analysis.
In our psychometric Hunter-Schmidt meta-analysis, we weight-
ed each judgment task by the number of judges to correct for
sampling error. To correct for measurement error with regards to
both the criterion and human judgment, we used an artifact
distribution compatible with the Hunter-Schmidt approach ([16],
p. 137). To correct for measurement error on the judgment side
within medicine and business, we use the studies’ reliability values
(e.g., [36]) or, otherwise, the retest reliabilities provided by Ashton
[68] who reported retest reliability values across and within
different domains. For example, when a study within the medical
domain did not report measurement reliability, we used the mean
of the reported test-retest reliability of .73 to correct for
measurement error. No area specific retest-reliability values were
available for measurement error correction by judges in the areas
of education, psychology or miscellaneous professions. We
therefore used the Reliability Generalization approach [69] to
correct the measurement error of judges in these areas. In line with
the Reliability Generalization theory, we estimate a retest-
reliability value for our measurement error corrections, namely
.90, as an upper bound of the reliability distributions, as the
averaged retest-reliability of professional judgments across do-
mains is .78 (see [68]). Hence, our assumed measurement-error
may have led to an underestimation of all components as we
assume a smaller measurement error relative to the average
reported by Ashton [68]. With regards to the measurement
reliability values on the ecological side of the lens model (i.e., the
criterion for against which human judgment is compared), we
distinguished between three types of criteria. First, for subjective
judgments, e.g., a physician’s judgment (see [25]); we used the
same approach as with the judgment side of the model as
previously described. Second, for test criteria (e.g., MMPI), we
used the test-specific retest-reliability value as available in the
Table 4. Comparison of estimations of the linear knowledge component (G) with different meta-analytical approaches ordered by
domain and experience level.
Bare-bones meta-analysis Psychometric meta-analysis
Credibility
interval
Credibility
interval
Domains, experience levels k N G varcorr 75% .10 .80 G varcorr 75% .10 .80
Medical sciencea 10 258 .61 .02 50.72 .42 .79 .82 .02 68.47 .64 1.00
Business science 9 239 .66 .07 15.85 .32 .99 .73 .08 15.85 .37 1.09
Experts 6 116 .55 .05 33.56 .26 .83 .60 .06 35.56 .28 .91
Students 3 123 .78 .05 6.95 .49 1.0 .86 .06 6.95 .54 1.17
Education science 4 156 .73 .01 35.62 .60 .85 .81 .01 35.62 .66 .85
Experts 2 40 .89 .00 313.80 .89 .89 .98 .00 313.80 .98 .98
Students 2 116 .68 .00 51.03 .68 .68
Psychology 9 105 .38 .02 73.77 .19 .56 .42 .03 73.77 .19 .64
Publication bias 11 121 .27 .13 45.46 2.19 .73
Experts 4 59 .17 .00 444.93 .17 .17 .18 .00 444.93 .18 .18
Students 5 46 .65 .03 57.65 .42 .87 .72 .04 57.65 .46 .97
Publication bias 7 62 .41 .21 35.14 2.17 .99
Miscellaneous 12 249 .68 .07 19.26 .34 1.00 .75 .08 19.27 .38 1.11
Publication bias 17 313 .54 .20 17.90 2.03 1.11
Experts 5 15 .92 .00 768.55 .92 .92 .96 .00 768.55 .96 .96
Students 11 234 .66 .06 24.15 .34 .97 .74 .08 24.15 .37 1.1
Overall 44 1,007 .63 .05 24.91 .34 .91 .77 .07 37.11 .43 1.1
Experts 27 488 .57 .04 43.69 .31 .82 .71 .06 49.80 .39 1.0
Students 21 519 .69 .04 21.81 .43 .95 .77 .06 22.00 .45 1.0
Note. k=Number of correlations (tasks) according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. N= Total sample size according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. G=mean true score
correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. varcorr= corrected variation according to Hunter and Schmidt ([16]., variance of true score correlation). 75%
rule = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artifacts, if below 75%, it indicates moderator variable. – mean true score correlation increased the value of
1.
aIn the medical science only experts are included.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.t004
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literature. Third, we did not correct objective criteria (e.g., an
angiography; see [24]), as we assumed that there is only minimal
measurement error with objective criteria. Finally, we considered
further artifacts, such as the dichotomization of a continuous
variable (see [38]).
Forest plots (see Figure 3) provide an overview of the results of
the included studies and psychometrically corrected confidence
intervals (see [16], p. 207). We also report credibility intervals as an
indication of the existence of moderators of judgmental achieve-
ment. In contrast to confidence intervals, credibility intervals are
calculated with standard deviations after removing artifacts. If the
credibility interval includes zero or is sufficiently large, then there is
a higher potential for moderator variables relative to when the
credibility interval is small and excludes zero. Hunter and Schmidt
[16] also recommend a simple 75% rule to detect moderator
variables, which is typically more accurate than significance tests
used to assess homogeneity. According to this rule, if the variance
after correcting for artifacts accounts for less than 75% of the
uncorrected variance (i.e., when artifacts account for less than 25%
of the total variance, moderator variables are suspected). It should
be noted that the variance remaining after artifact correction
represents the upper boundary of any potential moderator effects, as
it is impossible to correct of all potential artifacts. We emphasize that
we do not apply Fisher-Z transformations, in line with the
recommendations of Hunter and Schmidt [16].
Finally, we apply the trim-and-fill method introduced by Duval
and Tweedie [70] to estimate a possible publication bias in order
to check the robustness of our estimations. By applying the trim-
and-fill method, we estimated the effect sizes of potentially missing
studies and included them in a further psychometric meta-analysis
corrected for publication bias. In the following, we refer to this
approach that to our knowledge is hereby introduced to the
literature for the first time as the psychometric trim-and-fill method. We
use the retest-reliability values to correct for judgment reliability,
as in the case of education and psychology, and we assume no
measurement error on the criterion side.
Results
Tables 3 to 6 and Figure 3 display the results of the meta-
analyses. The results of the bare-bones meta-analysis for each
research area are displayed first, followed by the results of the
Table 5. Comparison of estimations of the consistency component (Rs) with different meta-analytical approaches ordered by
domain and experience level.
Bare-bones meta-analysis Psychometric meta-analysis
Credibility
interval
Credibility
interval
Domains, experience level k N Rs varcorr 75% .80 .10 Rs varcorr 75% .80 .10
Medical sciencea 10 258 .81 .00 74.95 .81 .81 .96 .00 126.87 .96 .96
Business science 9 239 .81 .01 28.60 .68 .93 .89 .02 28.60 .70 1.0
Experts 6 116 .62 .00 268.23 .62 .62 .69 .00 108.29 .69 .69
Students 3 123 .77 .03 12.68 .54 .99 .85 .03 12.68 .62 1.00
Education science 4 156 .73 .00 43.52 .60 .85 .93 .00 554.87 .93 .93
Publication bias 6 196 .67 .20 22.80 .09 1.25
Experts 2 40 .92 .00 1,241 .92 .92 .96 .00 1,241 .96 .96
Students 2 116 .66 .00 422.27 .66 .66 1.00 b
Psychology 12 150 .79 .01 71.34 .66 .91 .83 .01 71.34 .07 .96
Experts 4 59 .85 .01 48.83 .72 .98 .89 .01 48.83 .76 1.0
Students 8 91 .74 .00 107.28 .74 .74 .78 .00 107.28 .78 .78
Publication bias 11 115 .59 .09 35.15 .21 .97
Miscellaneous 12 249 .71 .00 90.86 .71 .71 .75 .00 90.92 .75 .75
Publication bias 17 272 .67 .05 34.01 2.23 1.5
Experts 5 15 .95 .00 1,724 .95 .95 .98 .00 1,724 .98 .98
Publication bias 6 19 .78 .06 66.77 .46 1.09
Students 11 234 .69 .00 148.50 .69 .69 .73 .00 148.50 .73 .73
Overall 47 1,052 .77 .00 53.34 .64 .90 .85 .00 100.63 .85 .85
Publication bias 58 1,260 .66 .14 17.31 .18 1.13
Experts 27 488 .83 .00 89.61 .83 .83 .92 .00 138.60 .92 .92
Publication bias 29 496 .90 .01 52.26 .77 1.02
Students 24 564 .71 .01 75.37 .63 .80 .78 .00 139.48 .78 .78
Publication bias 33 664 .61 .11 24.43 .18 1.18
Note. k=Number of correlations (tasks) according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. N= Total sample size according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. Rs=mean true score
correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. varcorr= corrected variation according to Hunter and Schmidt ([16]., variance of true score correlation). 75%
rule = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artifacts, if below 75%, it indicates moderator variable.
aIn medical science only experts are included.
bmean true score correlation increased the value of 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.t005
A Critical Meta-Analysis
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 December 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 12 | e83528
psychometric meta-analysis. Whenever the psychometrical trim-
and-fill method did not match the psychometric results with
regards to the indication of moderators, the suggested values are
reported as publication bias in the tables.
Judgmental Achievement
Table 3 and Figure 3 show the meta-analytic results of
judgmental achievement. Correcting for sampling error (bare
bones approach) only results in an estimated judgmental
Figure 3. Forest plots of judgmental achievement and the underlying components.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.g003
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achievement of .39. Correcting for additional artifacts with the
psychometric approach resulted in an increased estimate of .45.
That is, across all included lens model studies, human judgment
correlated .45 with the given criterion.
Domain and Expertise as Moderators
The relatively small reduction in variability resulting from the
psychometric approach relative to the bare bones approach
suggested the existence of moderator variables under the
Table 6. Comparison of estimations of the task-predictability component (Re) with different meta-analytical approaches ordered
by domain and experience level.
Bare-bones meta-analysis Psychometric meta-analysis
Credibility
Interval
Credibility
Interval
Domains, experience level k N Re varcorr 75% .10 .80 Re varcorr 75% .10 .80
Medical sciencea 10 258 .67 .00 105.89 .67 .67 .92 .00 198.55 .92 .92
Business science 9 239 .71 .02 34.97 .52 .89 b
Experts 6 116 .62 .00 108.29 .62 .62 b
Students 3 123 .79 .02 13.91 .60 .97 b
Education science 4 156 .70 .00 257.26 .70 .70 .74 .00 257.26 .74 .74
Experts 2 40 .68 .00 1,690 .68 .68 .72 .00 1,690 .72 .72
Students 2 116 .71 .00 145.93 .71 .71 .75 .00 145.93 .75 .75
Psychology 14 249 .68 .00 77.79 .68 .68 .72 .00 78.62 .72 .72
Publication bias 16 265 .64 .05 32.73 .35 .92
Expertsb 4 59 .80 .00 256.36 .80 .80 b
Students 10 176 .63 .00 91.12 .63 .63 .68 .00 91.12 .68 .68
Publication bias 13 220 .54 .09 27.90 .15 .94
Miscellaneous 12 249 .88 .01 23.75 .75 1.00 .93 .01 23.74 .80 1.00
Expertsb 5 15 .69 .00 356.44 .69 .69 b
Students 11 234 .89 .00 39.67 .89 .89 .94 .00 39.67 .94 .94
Overall 49 1,151 .73 .01 44.21 .60 .85 .81 .01 66.00 .69 .93
Experts 27 488 .68 .00 126.13 .68 .68 .76 .00 157.52 .76 .76
Publication bias 32 23 .59 .06 36.54 .27 .90
Students 26 663 .77 .02 31.23 .18 .58 .81 .02 31.45 .62 .99
Note. k=Number of correlations (tasks) according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. N= Total sample size according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. Re=mean true score
correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt [16]. varcorr= corrected variation according to Hunter and Schmidt ([16], variance of true score correlation). 75%
rule = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artifacts, if below 75%, it indicates moderator variable. – mean true score correlation increased the value of
1.
aIn medical science only experts are included.
bsee bare-bones meta-analysis, no correction because this category includes only objective criterions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.t006
Table 7. Comparison of the success of bootstrapping judges with a linear judgment model (GRe) based on different meta-
analytical approaches (bare-bones vs. psychometric approach).
Research area k N
Bare-bones
(GRe) Psychometric (GRe)
Estimated success
(Bare-bones)
Estimated success
(Psychometric)
Medical 10 258 .41 .76 .01 .36
Business 9 239 .47 .52b 2.03 .02
Educational 4 156 .51 .72 .12 .22
Psychologicala 9 105 .26 .30 .04 .08
Miscellaneous 12 249 .60 .70 .16 .26
Overalla 44 1007 .46 .62 .07 .23
a = there are 5 more Re values of studies included having 144 participants;
b = component Re is not corrected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083528.t007
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assumption of no measurement error on the criterion side for
objective criteria. We therefore re-ran the analyses within each
domain (medicine, business, education, psychology, miscella-
neous), for experts versus novices, and for expertise within domain
(e.g., expert teachers versus novice teachers). These subsequent
analyses revealed that judgmental achievement depended on
decision domain. Specifically, judgmental achievement was lowest
in psychology (ra= .22) and higher in education (ra= .39), medicine
(ra= .40), miscellaneous professional domains (ra= .44), and highest
in business (ra= .50). The results from the psychometric meta-
analysis confirmed this pattern of results.
Against our expectation, results indicated that students reached
a slightly higher judgmental achievement than experts. The 75%
rule and the credibility intervals indicated the existence of
moderator variables among student’s judgmental achievement.
We therefore reran our analysis, separating expertise within domains.
This analysis revealed that the potential for moderator variables
(once again as indicated by the 75% rule as well as by the
credibility intervals) amongst experts runs not across all domains.
In contrast, the analysis indicated the existence of moderator
variables amongst business science students only.
Inspection of the scatter plots of students’ judgmental achieve-
ment within the business domain indicated that Wright’s study
[32] had low values of judgmental achievement and might have
influenced our results. Excluding this study from the sample
increased estimated judgmental achievement (ra= .97, varcorr= .00),
but still indicated the presence of moderator variables according to
the 75% rule (30.51%).
Finally, the application of the psychometric trim-and-fill method
generally confirmed our results. However, estimates of judgmental
achievement among business experts dropped to a low value (no
publication bias was indicated in studies using business students).
Likewise, experts’ judgments in other research domains decreased
from .68 to .31. The application of the psychometric fill-and-trim
method to judgmental achievement in the field of education
indicated the existence of moderator variables. The potential for
moderator variables according to the credibility intervals and the
75% rule decreased after we separated the analysis by experience
level in the education domain. We therefore assume that
experience level is a moderator variable within education. The
judgment-achievement values for students in other domains
remained stable after correcting for potential publication bias.
Components of Judgmental Achievement
Tables 4 to 6 and Figure 3 present the estimates of the LME
parameters. As seen in Table 4, our results indicated high values of
the knowledge component (G) in nearly every domain/experience-
level except among experts in psychology. In addition, the results
from the psychometric trim-and-fill method suggested a lower
value for students’ knowledge components. Hence, it seems that
our analysis overestimated the knowledge component (G) among
students, although the knowledge component for students was
lower relative to experts.
Table 5 displays estimates of the consistency component (Rs).
The results from the bare-bones and psychometric meta-analyses
both suggest high values and generally indicate no moderator
variables for all analyses across domains and expertise-level. All of
the estimated consistency components (Rs) remain high when using
the psychometric fill-and-trim method. In addition, the results
from the psychometric fill-and-trim method indicated the
existence of moderators within education science, among experts
in the miscellaneous domain, and aggregated cross all domains.
Finally, Table 6 presents estimates for the task predictability
component (Re). All values were above .68 in each and every
analysis across domains and experience-level. The 75% rule
indicated moderator variables across all domains, mainly based on
students’ task predictabilities in business science and the miscel-
laneous domain. In addition, the psychometric trim-and-fill
method suggested that task predictabilities were overestimated
amongst psychology students, as the 75% rule suggested the
existence of moderators.
The Success of Bootstrapping Judges with a Linear
Model
Table 7 compares the success of bootstrapping judges with a
linear judgment model (see Equation 2) based on corrected versus
uncorrected estimates of LME parameters. Failure to correct the
component estimates for various artifacts clearly lead to underes-
timations of bootstrapping success. Indeed, the current results with
corrected parameters indicate that the linear judgment models are
actually more successful than previous studies have suggested (see
[2], [6]). Hence, using corrected estimations of the LME
components (e.g., G, Re) has practical consequences for the success
of bootstrapping with linear judgment models. We therefore argue
that corrected parameter estimates should be used to evaluate the
success of bootstrapping.
Discussion
The major finding of our study is that bare-bones meta-analysis
(e.g., [5], [6], see one-trial category), clearly underestimates true
judgmental achievement values relative to psychometric meta-
analysis, which more appropriately corrects for study design
artifacts. Consequently, we argue that a psychometric meta-
analysis is needed to more accurately evaluate judgment accuracy
and can help researchers to more efficiently detect moderators. So
far, previous meta-analyses of lens model studies have neglected
the need to correct for multiple artifacts, although even minor
increases in judgmental achievement may have a high practical
impact at the individual level, for example, in life or death
decisions in the medical domain. Our results indicate that failure
to correct for artifacts (as with a bare-bones meta-analysis) leads to
underestimations of all LME parameters across and within
expertise domains, and the potential for moderator variables is
generally overestimated. Parameter estimates from psychometric
meta-analysis can be used to improve linear judgment models and
hence bootstrapping, especially in areas where the price of false
decision-making is high.
With regards to specific moderators of judgmental achievement,
the present study confirms the pattern previously found for
comparisons between different domains [5], namely, that judgmen-
tal achievement varies greatly across the medical, educational,
psychological, business and other professional domains. In line
with the meta-analysis of Aegisdottir et al. (p. 368) [1], we found
low judgmental achievement in psychological science, for example,
in the prediction of violence. Our analysis revealed that such low
judgmental achievement within psychology may be explained by a
moderate knowledge component. Hence, the question arises
whether judgmental achievement in psychology can be improved
by increasing the knowledge component, meaning that psychol-
ogists would need to expand their relevant knowledge for linear
information integration. The success of psychometrically-corrected
linear judgment models was higher than the low human
judgmental achievement in psychology. Therefore, it might be
particularly worthwhile to bootstrap judges within this domain (for
further information, see [71]).
Against our expectation, the results of the meta-analyses suggest
that experts do not make much better judgments than non-experts
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at the aggregated level. However, the effect of expertise appears to
depend on domain. Specifically, within the business and psychol-
ogy domains, students had higher judgmental achievement than
experts. This surprising result may imply situations of learning and
feedback (see also [22]). That is, higher judgmental achievement
among experts relative to students may indicate higher feedback
and learning in the respective domain. It seems possible to
improve judgmental achievement through feedback and learning.
There is only one study [47], however, that directly compares
experts and students in four different tasks. Our results and
conclusions regarding this point should therefore be taken with
caution.
An innovative aspect of the current study was that we estimated
publication bias using a psychometric trim-and-fill method,
potentially leading to better estimates. To the best of our
knowledge, calculation of publication bias has previously only
been applied within bare-bones meta-analyses (see [72]), and we
are not aware of any previous psychometric meta-analysis that has
corrected for publication bias in this way. We recommend that
researchers check the robustness of the results of future psycho-
metric meta-analyses by using the psychometric trim-and-fill
method described in this paper. We caution, however, that the
psychometric trim-and-fill method used in the current study may
need improvement and replication, because the underlying data
were heterogeneous, which can potentially be problematic.
Indeed, Rothstein [73] asserted that disentangling the effects of
publication bias from other sources of heterogeneity can be
difficult.
As common in meta-analytical research, the studies included in
the analyses did not always report all of the data needed to
calculate ‘‘true’’ judgmental achievement values (e.g., measure-
ment reliability). Indeed, researchers interested in conducting
psychometric meta-analyses often face the problem of missing
data. Based on the Reliability Generalization theory [69], we
suggest estimating a measurement error with an rr= .9 to check the
robustness of the data as a possible solution. We also emphatically
recommend that future researchers thoroughly and consequently
report all relevant information on study method and results (e.g.,
reliability values, dichotomizations) in order to enhance the
accuracy of further meta-analyses (and hence their usefulness).
We would also like to encourage researchers to report more
idiographic data in lens model studies (see [21]). For instance,
multi-level analysis (see [74]) could be applied to gain further
knowledge about judges’ strategies within and between tasks.
In the current study, we corrected for a number of methodo-
logical artifacts (sampling error, measurement error, and dichot-
omization). Importantly, there may well be additional artifacts for
which we did not correct. On this note, we heartily agree with
Hunter and Schmidt [16] that, ‘‘all quantitative estimates are
approximations. Even if these estimates are quite accurate, it is
always desirable to make them more accurate, if possible’’ (p. 168).
For instance, Wittmann [66], [67], further extended Hunter-
Schmidt’s psychometric approach by adding the symmetry
concept. We did not control for symmetry in the current analysis.
Hence, we may have underestimated overall judgmental achieve-
ment, although our analyses rarely indicated any moderator
variables, suggesting that there is not much variance left for further
artifact correction.
In the current study, we focused on the evaluation of the success
of bootstrapping with only linear judgment models. However, we
did not consider experience within domains in detail. Further
analyses are needed to shed light on this topic (see [75]).
As linear judgment models are often criticized for lack of user
friendliness, we also see our analysis as an inspiration for the
development of new judgment models (see [76]). The true power
of psychometrically corrected linear judgment models should
urgently be evaluated against new kinds of judgment models.
In sum, our study demonstrates that psychometric meta-analysis
is useful for evaluating judgmental achievement and for construct-
ing better linear judgment models for bootstrapping. This first
psychometric meta-analysis of lens model studies confirms and
extends previous results from bare-bones meta-analysis: Judgmen-
tal achievement clearly varies across domains. Our analysis also
extended previous research on the potential moderating role of
expertise within and between decision domains. The current
analysis revealed that failure to correct for methodological artifacts
can lead to underestimations of judgmental achievement and
overestimations of heterogeneity between studies. Consequently,
the success of bootstrapping with linear judgment models is also
underestimated if LME parameters are not corrected for
methodological artifacts. We therefore recommend that future
researchers follow a psychometric approach in order to arrive at
less biased estimations and more successful linear judgment
models. If the relevant data for psychometric analyses (e.g., data
on measurement error) are not immediately available, researchers
can conduct robustness analysis with estimated values.
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